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Zammit: The Ghost of Sears-Compco is Finally Laid to Rest (Or Is It?)

THE GHOST OF SEARS-COMPCO IS FINALLY LAID
TO REST (OR IS IT?)
by Joseph P. Zammit*
LAST term the Supreme Court ended nearly ten years of speculation concerning the potential impact on state trade secret law
of its companion decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.'
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 2 Those cases
seemed to raise the possibility that any state law protection for
scientific or technical ideas might be invalid as inconsistent with
the patent system enacted by Congress.
In Sears, Stiffel, the patentee of a pole lamp, brought an
action against Sears charging patent infringement and unfair
competition. Sears, it seems, had marketed a pole lamp virtually
identical to Stiffel's, but at a significantly lower price. A federal
district court in Illinois held the patents invalid for want of invention, but enjoined Sears from unfairly competing by selling pole
lamps identical or confusingly similar to Stiffel's lamps. 3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
on the ground that the likelihood of confusion as to the source of
the product was sufficient to make out a case of unfair competition under Illinois law, without the necessity of showing that
Sears had "palmed off" its pole lamps as those of Stiffel.4 In
reversing, the Supreme Court held that an unpatentable article
"is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever
chooses to do so."'
The facts and holding in Compco were almost identical, except that the product in issue there was a fluorescent lighting
fixture rather than a pole lamp. In explaining its decision, the
Court said:'

[Wihen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright,
state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid
copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University. A.B. Fordham, 1968; J.D. Harvard, 1971; LL.M. New York University, 1974.
1. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Docket No. 58-C-1067 (1962).
4. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
5. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
6. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
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statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.
Clearly neither Sears nor Compco involved the protection of
trade secrets. The items in question were on the market and open
to inspection by anyone willing to purchase them. The only matter in dispute was whether a state, through its law of unfair competition, could forbid the copying of a competitor's unpatentable
product. The Supreme Court said it could not.
Nevertheless, the specter of "patent preemption" was born
and continued to haunt the courts and commentators until apparently laid to rest in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.7 It was
thought that if federal patent policy prohibited the states from
outlawing the copying of unpatentable products that had been
placed on the market, perhaps it extended so far as to forbid any
kind of state protection for ideas which did not rise to that level
of invention required for a patent. If so, it would mean an end to
state protection of trade secrets. The concept of patent preemption has been widely criticized in the journals,8 although some
commentators have felt that at least some form of preemption
might be proper
Prior to Kewanee Oil, four circuit courts of appeals considered the question of preemption in the light of Sears and Compco.
The Second, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits all refused to extend these decisions so as to invalidate state trade secret protection."0 As for the Supreme Court, it was presented with an opportunity to speak on the preemption issue in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,"
but refrained on the grounds that the state courts should first be
given an opportunity to determine the extent to which they would
U.S. -. 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974).
7.8. See, e.g., Doerfer, The Limits on TradeSecret Law Imposed by FederalPatent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1432 (1967); Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton:
Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 17 (1971); Comment, The Viability of
Trade Secret ProtectionAfter Lear v. Adkins, 16 VML. L. REv. 551 (1971); 84 HARv. L.
REv. 477 (1970).
9. See Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-emption-TheAftermath of Sears
and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 713 (1967); Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent
Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 638 (1970); Note, PatentPreemptionof Trade Secret Protec.
tion Meeting Judicial Standardsof Patentability,87 HARv. L. Rev. 807 (1974).
10. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar Indus., Inc. v.
Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971);
Water Service, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Servo Corp.
of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
934 (1966).
11. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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Ghost of Sears-Compco
continue to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpa2
tented secret ideas.'
Despite the uniformity among the other circuits which had
ruled on the preemption question, the Sixth Circuit in Kewanee
Oil'3 dramatically refused to follow suit. In that case, the court
held that Ohio's trade secret law, which could protect a device
which would be "an appropriate subject for a patent under the
United States Patent Laws,"' 4 but which could no longer be patented because of failure to apply for a patent within the requisite
period of time,' 5 "is in conflict with the policies and purposes of
those patent laws"' 6 and hence invalid.
Thus the Supreme Court was faced with a conflict in the
circuits and the necessity of finally dealing with the ghost of
preemption which it had conjured up in Sears and Compco.
The Stakes
Before proceeding to a consideration of the Court's decision
in Kewanee Oil, it is worthwhile to pause a moment to reflect
upon the serious competing interests at stake. For purposes of this
discussion, we will adopt the widely accepted Restatement definition of a trade secret: 7
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.
Of course, a trade secret need not be patentable-though it
may be. About all that is required is that it be a commercially
useful idea that is not generally known in the industry. A patent,
however, will issue only for a "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter", 8 or an improvement thereof, which is
new," useful,20 and nonobvious. 2 1 These requirements have often
12. Id. at 675.
13. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 1086.
15. A patent may not issue for an invention which has been in "public use or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1086 (6th Cir. 1973).

17.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b (1939).

18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
19. Id. §§ 101-02.
20. Id. § 101.

21. Id. § 103.
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been strictly construed by the courts, including the Supreme
Court, leading the late Justice Jackson to complain that "the
only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able
'22
to get its hands on."
In any event, if an invention is deemed sufficiently inventive
to earn and retain the protection of a patent, the patentee is
entitled to the exclusive right to make, use or sell that invention
for a period of seventeen years.2 In exchange for this statutory
"monopoly", the inventor must file an application containing a
description of how to make and use the invention.2 4 After the
expiration of the statutory period, the invention enters the public
domain, and anyone may avail himself of the art set forth in the
patent specification.
On the other hand, a trade secret has value only so long as
it remains what it is: a secret. The law confers no right to exclusive use on the owner of a trade secret. To the extent that it
becomes known to one or more competitors through accidental
disclosure, independent invention or reverse engineering, 0 a trade
secret loses its claim to legal protection vis--vis those competitors. And if an idea becomes generally known in an industry, it
loses its protected trade secret status altogether.26
Courts have accorded legal protection to trade secrets on a
variety of theories: preservation of property rights, prevention of
unjust enrichment, enforcement of contracts or fiduciary obligations and redress of tortious conduct.2 1 Whatever the rationale,
until Sears and Compco, no one in modem times seems to have
seriously suggested that there might be a conflict between federal
patent policy and the states' attempt to enforce some standard
of commercial morality. Nevertheless, a plausible argument for
preemption can be made.
The United States Constitution provides:"0
The Congress shall have Power. . . .To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their. . .Discoveries ....
22. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
24. Id. § 112.

25. Reverse engineering refers to the process of analyzing a product in order to dis.
cover the manner of its manufacture.
26. See generally R. MiLORmM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03 (1973).
27. Id. § 7.03.
28. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), wherein federal patent

preemption was argued to the Court but not ruled on.
29. Art. I, § 8,cl.8.
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The First Congress almost immediately exercised the power conferred on it by the Constitution by enacting the Patent Act of
1790.30 There has been a patent statute ever since.'
Implicit in the constitutional grant of power and the implementing statutes is the concept that a patent, i.e. a federally
guaranteed right to exclusive use for a limited term of years, is
an incentive for invention. Thomas Jefferson, one of the three
original patent commissioners, ably enunciated the philosophy
behind the patent system:3"
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late
in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea,
the fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature
has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it.
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition,
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable
of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an
exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience
of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.
In accordance with the foregoing philosophy, Congress, in
exercising its constitutional power, has conditioned bestowal of
the patent incentive upon full disclosure of how to make and use
the invention. Although an idea may not be the subject of a
natural property right, Congress may grant temporary exclusive
30. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
31. The current patent statute is the Patent Act of 1952, Title 35 of the UnitedStates
Code.

32. VI WRrriNGs OF THors JEFFRSMON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed. 1857).
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enjoyment of its fruits as a concession to human avarice in order
to secure a greater public good: the stimulation of invention.
Having achieved that object, however, Congress mandates that
the idea be returned to the public domain and assures that result
by requiring full disclosure in the patent application. This exchange of secrecy for temporary exclusivity has become a cornerstone of the patent system.
It would appear that any scheme which casts the mantle of
legal protection over ideas without requiring any quid pro quo
tends to defeat the disclosure policy of the patent laws. To what
extent the policy is defeated is debatable. It may be argued that,
though limited in duration, patent protection is so far superior to
trade secret protection that almost all inventors would opt for the
former rather than the latter, if possible. Yet the hope of indefinite protection, plus the expense of prosecuting a patent application, may sometimes deter an inventor from seeking a patent,
especially if his invention is of doubtful patentability.3 3 Moreover,
even in those instances where a patent is clearly unavailable, it
might be maintained that trade secret protection defeats the purpose of the patent system because Congress intended that there
be no protection for inventions which do not measure up to the
statutory prerequisites of novelty, utility and nonobviousness.
The proponents of common law protection, however, argue
that trade secret law is not only not inconsistent with the patent
laws, but is essential to the continued vitality of our technological
society. According to this school, the unpatentable invention is
often the most important:
These unprotectable inventions are the milk upon which
society's technology lives. The patentable inventions, the cream
inventions, are used to make frosting on the R & D [research
and development] budget or to reduce the losses being suffered
by an R & D budget. They are very important. But they are
worth much too little to support the economic requirements of
new technology which includes many many more failures than
successes.
• . . Patents by their nature cannot and do not disclose all
new technology: the patent is not a carrot that can fetch disclo33. The expense of prosecuting a patent application may ultimately prove to be for
naught if a patent is refused or is subsequently invalidated by the courts. In addition, if
a patent issues but is subsequently invalidated, the inventor loses even the protection of
secrecy.
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sures of the mass of technology within 35 U.S.C. § 101.1
Trade secret and patent law are like two horses hitched to
the same public-interest-carriage-competition in innovation,
competition in R & D, competition in bringing to public enjoyment things which are not yet there. And no pursuit of competition in the static group of things already here can properly be
set above the carriage of public interest in innovative new technology.
Trade secret and patent protection are both as necessary
and as compatible as the two wheels of a bicycle, without which
vitally needed technology cannot ride."
Thus the patent laws are seen as one, but not the exclusive,
incentive to technological innovation.
The dollar significance of unpatented technology can certainly not be doubted. Though precise figures are unavailable,"
one commentator has estimated the present capitalized asset
value of American trade secret know-how to be on the order of
several billion dollars. 7 But even beyond the destructive effect
preemption might have on the value of present trade secret technology, there is the fear that there would be a chilling effect on
future technological innovation should the theory of preemption
be adopted. Clearly the economic stakes involved in the preemption question are enormous.
Aside from purely economic implications, the advocates of
trade secret protection argue that public policy favors commercial morality and that the law should encourage honesty among
businessmen and loyalty by employees. "The necessity of good
faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the
commercial world."3 " Preemption, it is argued, would in effect be
a license to steal unpatented technology which it may have taken
thousands or even millions of dollars to create. Such a result
would be abhorrent to the equitable spirit of the law.
34. Arnold, Shadows Do Not Fight, reprinted in

PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS TODAY

37, 75 (Practising Law Institute 1973).
35. Id. at 83.

36. See generally E.LOVELL, APPRAISING FOREIGN LICENSING PERFORMANCE, STUDIES IN
BusiNEss PoucY, No. 128 (Nat'l. Ind. Conf. Bd. 1969); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: ITS ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1967); Lightman, Comparative
Income Roles of U.S. IndustrialProperty Rights Abroad, 14 IDEA 352 (1970); 51 SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS (March, 1971).
37. Arnold, supra note 34, at 100.
38. National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 459, 462 (1902),
afl'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903).
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These then were the conflicting considerations facing the Supreme Court as it proceeded to decide Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.
The Court Speaks
The facts in Kewanee Oil were typical of the "peripatatic
employee" variety of trade secret litigation. Harshaw Chemical
Company, an unincorporated division of the plaintiff, Kewanee
Oil Company, was a leading manufacturer of a synthetic crystal
useful in the detection of ionizing radiation. Research had begun
in 1949 and by 1966, as a result of a great expenditure of time and
money, Harshaw succeeded in growing a 17-inch crystal-something no one else had previously done. Harshaw
deemed some of the processes which it had developed to accomplish this feat to be trade secrets. Concededly these secrets were
appropriate subjects for patent protection, but could no longer be
patented because they had been in commercial use for more than
a year.39
The individual defendants were former employees of
Harshaw who formed or later joined the defendant Bicron Corporation. While at Harshaw, all the individual defendants had executed confidentiality agreements pursuant to which they promised not to disclose trade secrets learned as employees there. Bicron had been formed in August, 1969 to compete with Harshaw
in the production of crystals, and by April, 1970 had also grown
a 17-inch crystal. 0
Kewanee Oil brought suit in the Northern District of Ohio
seeking injunctive relief and damages for the misappropriation of
its trade secrets. The district court held for the plaintiff, but the
Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground that Ohio's trade secret law
conflicted with the federal patent laws."
2 the Supreme Court
Relying upon Goldstein v. California,"
first rejected the contention that the states are totally precluded
by the Constitution itself from acting to protect trade secrets. The
Court in Goldstein had held that the grant of power to Congress
contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution was not exclusive, and that, at least in the case of writings, the states had not
relinquished all power to legislate with respect to intellectual
39. See note 15 supra.

40. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,

-

U.S. at

, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1974).

41. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).

42. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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property within their borders. 3 Finding no reason to distinguish
between writings and discoveries insofar as the question of "constitutional preemption" is concerned, the Court in Kewanee Oil
held that "[t]he only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with
the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress. .... ,,4
After reviewing the objectives of the patent laws and state
trade secret laws, the Supreme Court held that the patent laws
enacted by Congress do not preempt trade secret law. 45 Since both
systems encourage invention, the Court felt that there could be
no conflict in that respect. 4 As to the patent policy of disclosure,
the Court considered the four categories of discovery protected by
trade secret law-nonpatentable subject matter, matter clearly
not meeting the statutory prerequisites for a patent,47 matter of
doubtful patentability and clearly patentable matter-and found
no significant conflict in any instance between federal disclosure
4
policy and such protection.
With respect to the first two categories, the Court reasoned
that there could be no legitimate expectation of a patent application, and hence no possibility of conflict with the patent policy
of disclosure. Moreover, trade secret protection in these areas has
the positive benefit of encouraging invention and know-how li49
censing, despite the lack of patent protection.
With respect to matter of doubtful patentability, the Court
conceded that abolition of trade secret protection might encourage some inventors to apply for a patent when they otherwise
would not have done so. However, the Court saw a serious problem in such a result: those who might be encouraged to apply for
a patent by the absence of trade secret protection would "include
inventors possessing the chaff as well as the wheat."5 While some
of the chaff (that is, nonpatentable discoveries) might be thrown
out by the Patent Office, in the meantime society would be deprived of the benefit of such discoveries through trade secretprotected licensing." Even worse, some of the chaff might slip by,
and society would then be burdened with an unwarranted monop43. Id. at 560.
44. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

-U.S.

at_

94 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1974).

Id. at.,
94 S. Ct. at 1891.
Id. at---, 94 S. Ct. at 1887.
That is, novelty, utility and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., - U.S. _, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1887-91 (1974).
Id. at
, 94 S. Ct. at 1888.
Id. at
, 94 S. Ct. at 1889.
Id.
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oly.5 2 The Court concluded that "[e]liminating trade secret law
for the doubtfully patentable invention is thus likely to have
deleterious effects on society and patent policy which we cannot
say are balanced out by the speculative gain which might result
from the encouragement of some inventors with doubtfully patentable inventions which deserve protection to come forward and
5' 3
apply for patents.
Finally, as regards clearly patentable inventions, the Court
felt that the protection afforded by a patent is so far superior to
that offered by trade secret law that inventors would almost always opt for a patent. Moreover, the occasional inventor who
might not would pose no threat to technological progress because
it is likely that if something is to be discovered at all it will be
discovered by more than one person; thus society would not long
be deprived of the benefits of his invention. 4
The Court also rejected two intermediate solutions to the
preemption problem, one explicitly and the other implicitly. The
first was a suggestion that, since trade secret law does not produce any positive benefits not attainable through the patent laws
in the area of clearly patentable inventions (as opposed to the
beneficial effects of trade secret protection in other areas), partial
preemption might be appropriate. 55 The Court dismissed this possibility' for two reasons. Since there is no real conflict between
trade secret law and the federal policy of disclosure even in the
case of clearly patentable inventions, partial preemption would
be inappropriate. In addition, partial preemption would create
serious problems for state courts in administering their trade secret law because they would be faced as a preliminary matter,
with the nearly impossible task of distinguishing between what
an inventor could and could not reasonably consider to be
"clearly patentable."5
The other alternative, which the Court rejected sub silentio,
was that of recognizing preemption of the injunctive remedy only,
thus permitting the recovery of damages for trade secret violations. This possibility was set forth by Justice Douglas in his
52. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
53. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., U.S. at
(1974).

54. Id. at

-,

94 S. Ct. 1879, 1889-90

_ 94 S. Ct. at 1890-91.

55. See Note, PatentPreemptionof Trade Secret Protection Meeting JudicialStandards of Patentability,supra note 9.
56. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., U.S. at
, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1891 (1974).
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dissent.-" Presumably because it found no conceptual difficulty in
the parallel existence of two different forms of protection, the
Court apparently did not feel it necessary to comment on Justice
Douglas' proposal.
The Ghost Remains
The Supreme Court obviously wished to put an end to the
patent preemption arguments once and for all. Such arguments
were distracting courts from the central issue of liability in too
many trade secret cases.
It must be said to its credit that the Court appears to have
reached the only realistic solution possible. The financial results
of a holding of preemption could well have been catastrophic for
American industry. Moreover, common law protection of trade
secrets is too well-established to be easily discarded by a single
stroke of the pen." Congress itself has recognized the special status of trade secrets in a number of pieces of legislation. 9 As to the
possibility of opting for partial preemption, such a doctrine, as
the Court indicated, would clearly be unworkable, whatever its
appeal may be for theoreticians.6"
Nevertheless, having said that, one is still left with the feeling that all is not as it should be. There remains, if not a conflict,
at least an inconsistency between what seems to have been the
constitutional and Congressional aim of encouraging disclosure of
technological innovations and the existence of a state law system
of protection for such innovations which, rather than demand
disclosure, compels secrecy. This inconsistency is all the more
disturbing when one considers that patent protection for the highest levels of invention lasts only seventeen years, while state protection for lesser degrees of creativity is potentially permanent.
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's rationalization, it is
possible that some inventors of patentable discoveries may choose
not to apply for a patent in the hope of retaining exclusive use of
their inventions for more than seventeen years. While the relative
weakness of trade secret protection and the "ripeness of time"
theory of invention may tend to dissipate this possibility, it does
not eliminate it. Thus we have, in the formula for Coca-Cola, the
57. Id. at

-,

94 S. Ct. at 1894.

58. Legal protection for trade secrets was first recognized in the United States in'
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 (2 Browne) Mass. 452 (1868).
59. See generally R. MmLGmua, TRADE SECRETS ch. 6 (1973).
60. The federal courts themselves cannot agree on what is and is not patentable. See
I. KAYTON, PATENT PROPERTY 224-25 (1973).
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standard illustration of a patentable item whose owners have
opted for trade secret, rather than patent, protection. That formula, which has supposedly never been duplicated, continues to
be a trade secret after more than half a century.
In addition, there is something rather arbitrary about the
difference in result mandated by Sears-Compco on the one hand,
and that permitted by Kewanee Oil on the other. Under the former, states may not protect discoveries embodied in products
that can be reverse-engineered, while under the latter they may
protect discoveries if they cannot be discerned from an examination of the product itself. This difference in result has nothing to
do with the intrinsic value of the discovery itself. Thus the same
blatant copying which is uniformly condemned as industrial espionage if committed inside a competitor's plant may be perfectly
legal when done once the competitor's product has been marketed. The factor of lead time may diminish the harm to the
copying victim, but it cannot eliminate such harm.
To resolve these problems, and to secure a uniform system
of trade secret protection as well, legislation by Congress is necessary.
A Legislative Solution
Suggestions for national trade secret legislation are not new,'
but the call for such legislation takes on added significance in the
light of Kewanee Oil. It seems clear now that the problems inherent in the parallel existence of the federal patent system and the
state trade secret system cannot be fully resolved by judicial
interpretation.
These problems could, however, be solved by adopting a procedure for federal registration of trade secrets and the specific
abolition of separate state protection for such secrets. This presents no conceptual difficulty because even the Supreme Court in
Kewanee Oil recognized that Congress has the power to preempt
if it wishes to exercise it.62
For convenience, the registering body could be the Patent
Office. Unlike the situation with patent applications, however,
the Patent Office would make no attempt to screen the registra61. See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 4, 32-34 (1962).
62. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., U.S. at -. , 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1974).
While it may be argued that Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution does not grant Congress
the authority to enact the sort of non-exclusive registration system being proposed here,
such authority could certainly be found in the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 3.
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tion of trade secrets except to make sure that the subject matter
of the proposed registration is within the statutory definition of
a trade secret and that there is a sufficient disclosure of how to
practice the invention. Once the secret is registered, the registrant would be entitled to a limited form of protection for a specified period of years to ensure recovery of his investment-perhaps
five or seven. In the absence of registration, there would be no
legal protection at all. After the expiration of the statutory period, the trade secret would be deemed to be in the public domain
and equally accessible to all.
Unlike a patent, registration should not constitute a right to
exclusive use. Rather, registration should be primafacie evidence
of discovery or invention. The copying of registered trade secrets
would be prohibited during the statutory term and the registrant
would have the full range of remedies-including injunctions and
damages-available to him to enforce his rights. 3 Independent
discovery, however, would not be prohibited, although the burden
of proof on the question of independent discovery should be on
the party claiming it. 4 Moreover, the registrant would also be
subject to the other traditional trade secret defenses including
laches and unclean hands.
Multiple registrations would pose no problem since the trade
secret would enter the public domain five years after the first
registration. Thereafter anyone could make use of the technology
set forth in the registration without fear of liability for infringement.
A statutory scheme like the one proposed would promote the
public interest in disclosure of nonpatentable technological advances without decreasing the incentive for invention. Inventions
meeting the more stringent prerequisites of novelty, utility and
nonobviousness would still qualify for a patent, and there would
be no incentive not to patent if possible since trade secret protection is strictly limited to a period of less than seventeen years.
Furthermore, such a scheme would eliminate the arbitrary distinction between products which can and cannot be reverse63. Enforcement of registration rights would be by suit in federal district court. In
order to avoid overburdening the federal courts, however, it might be wise to provide for
concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts.
64. Because of the difficult problems of proof involved in the question of independent
discovery, it would probably be advisable to keep the details of registrations secret during
the statutory period. In that way, at least, a defendant could not be accused of copying
from the registration material itself.
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engineered because all copying of registered secrets would be prohibited.
The limited form of protection described above should be
required only for matters of technological interest. Although
things like customer lists and business plans have traditionally
been encompassed within the concept of a trade secret, they
should probably be excluded from the statutory definition of that
term. There does not appear to be any significant public interest
in disclosure of such matters to justify their inclusion in the statutory scheme.
Conclusion
Although Kewanee Oil ostensibly reconciles the patent laws
with state trade secret laws, the public interest demands that
something be done to assure that future scientific discoveries ultimately be made available for the benefit of society-at-large. In
the words of Thomas Jefferson: "If nature has made any one thing
less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power called an idea .... ."I'These demands of the public interest can only be met through appropriate
legislation.
65. See VI WRrTINGS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,

supra note 32, at 180.
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